

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

DDI- 5-76

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 149/75  
31 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: NIO/SP Interagency Production Program Meeting

1. Once again you are invited to participate in a meeting of intelligence research managers to plan interagency intelligence production in the field of foreign strategic programs, forces, and capabilities. The meeting will be held on Thursday, 8 January 1976 in Room 7-E-62 CIA Headquarters, from 1330 until not later than 1600. Please inform  extension  of your planned attendance or the name of your representative. 25X1

2. My thought is to approach this planning in essentially the same way as in 1974 and 1975, namely, with your help and guidance to identify a short list of candidate topics for analytical memoranda on the basis of our mutual appreciation of the unresolved intelligence questions currently affecting US national security interests. You will recall that in previous years we have based this candidate list on (a) what we learned from our work on estimates and studies during the year; (b) the KIQ's and KIQ strategies; (c) direct requests or indications of interest by policymaking consumers; and (d) our own perceptions as professionals. NIO/SP has then undertaken to prepare terms of reference, set schedules, and identify team leaders or appropriate USIB committees to manage the projects. We have also consulted with the DCI and representative consumers to be sure that the proposed projects meet their perceptions of priority needs. We have then informed you by memorandum of the final list and solicited your support in accomplishing the tasks.

3. We have been urged by those who worked on NIE 11-3/8 to start our 1976 projects as promptly as possible, in part to avoid last year's difficulty of having projects vital to that estimate still incomplete when needed as contributions. We also have the benefit of a thoughtful post-mortem recently prepared by the 11-3/8 team. Finally, we are already aware of several studies needed in the coming months by particular consumers. Hence it is believed desirable to hold our planning meeting immediately.

4. On the other hand, management changes in intelligence and defense, as well as continuing uncertainties about the outcome of the SALT TWO

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negotiations, add weight to our usual expectation that unforeseen requirements will in due course lengthen any list of projects we identify at this time. Hence the continuing need to keep the initial list short.

5. Attached for your convenience are: (a) interagency projects undertaken under NIO/SP auspices in 1974 and 1975--in addition to NIEs and SNIEs on Soviet and Chinese strategic capabilities and on prospects for nuclear proliferation; (b) problem areas identified in the recently-completed post-mortem on NIE 11-3/8-75; and (c) an initial NIO/SP list of projects believed worthy of priority consideration for the coming months.

6. At our meeting next Thursday, I propose to proceed as follows:

a. Recommendations from NIE 11-3/8-75 team: [REDACTED] 25X1

b. Recommendations from other attendees: each participant.  
(It would be helpful to all if participants would bring short titles or descriptions of recommended projects in writing in multiple copies.)

c. Recommendations from NIO/SP. (Based on attachment C.)

d. Preliminary listing of priority projects and discussion of analytical resource availability. (All participants.)

7. Although the projects in the attachments deal almost exclusively with Soviet strategic capabilities, your consideration of outstanding priority needs relating to any foreign strategic programs or capabilities is invited.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Howard Stoertz, Jr. [REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer  
for Strategic Programs

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Attachments (as stated)

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
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
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MGen. G. Keegan, Jr. (ACSI/USAF)  
MGen. H. Aaron (ACSI/Army)

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Mr. E. Hineman (CMAIC)  
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DIO/SF [Redacted]

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Chairman, NIE 11-3/8-75

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NIO/SP

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Attachment A1 to:

17 December 1975

INTERAGENCY REPORTS, STUDIES AND MEMORANDA

1974

Forecast of Intelligence Lead Times (Back-up Paper, NSSM 191)

Possible Soviet Employment of Strategic Forces, May 1974

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Prospects for Determining Accuracies of Soviet Strategic Ballistic  
Missiles, June 1974

25X1

Capabilities and Potential Employment of the Backfire Force, July 1974

25X1

NSDM 242: Soviet and PRC Reactions to US Nuclear Weapon Employment Policy,  
1 August 1974

25X1

Soviet Look-Down, Shoot-Down Air Defense Capability, September 1974

25X1

A Soviet Land-Mobile ICBM: Evidence of Development and Considerations  
Affecting a Decision on Deployment, October 1974

25X1

Prospects for Soviet Success in Improving Detection of Submarines in Open  
Ocean Areas, November 1974

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Attachment A2 to:

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INTERAGENCY REPORTS, STUDIES AND MEMORANDA

1975

Soviet Capabilities to Develop Strategic Laser Systems, February 1975

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Soviet Strategic Policies and Force Options Under the Vladivostok  
Understanding, March 1975

25X1

Soviet Strategic Cruise Missile Systems, September 1975

25X1

Concealment and Deception in Soviet Strategic Programs, September 1975

25X1

Assessment of Soviet SS-N-8/D-Class SSBN System Accuracy, November 1975

25X1

Soviet Dependence on Space Systems, November 1975

25X1

Prospects for Improvement in the Soviet Union's Low-Altitude Air Defenses,  
Forthcoming

25X1

Soviet Approaches to Defense Against Ballistic Missile Submarines and  
Prospects for Success, Forthcoming

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PROBLEM AREAS IDENTIFIED BY NIE 11-3/8-75 TEAM

1. We saw a possible need for additional annexes--or possibly inter-agency studies--on the following subjects to support the estimate:

- Command and control of strategic forces.
- Peripheral strategic forces.
- Intelligence and warning capabilities.
- Research on future strategic weapon concepts that might significantly impact on the strategic balance.
- Strategic passive defense (civil defense, maskirovka, hardening of nonstrategic military facilities, etc.).

2. We identified several areas where the analytical and evidential underpinnings of our judgments were weak and probably subject to improvement with further work:

- a. ICBM Force Reliability. This factor is significant in our assessments of Soviet counterforce capabilities, but the basis for our figures and the uncertainties surrounding them were not treated as rigorously as some other factors. Paragraph 110 of Volume II was a last-minute add-on and appears superficial.

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c. Silo Hardness. We probably did as well as we could this year on silo hardness, but more analysis may help us do better next time. We were unable to give any assessment of SS-17 silo hardness, for example. Also, we told our readers that we were analyzing new information on SS-11 silo hardness and might revise our estimates. We owe a follow-up here.

d. Netting of Air Defense Radars. This factor is significant to our judgment about Soviet low altitude air defense capabilities, yet we admit that we do not fully understand what improvements have been made in air defense data processing and interceptor-vectoring equipment (para. 227 of Vol. II). This underscores the need for a continuing attack on the problem.

e. Nuclear Warheads on SAMs. We were unable to be at all precise about how many SAM sites have nuclear-tipped SAMs, and our treatment of the effect of such SAMs on low altitude defense capabilities was transparently thin. It should be possible to be more definitive on these subjects next year.

f. ASW. Our judgments about Soviet ASW capabilities (or lack thereof) were based partly on "our understanding of US R&D." There is a serious question as to how much intelligence analysts really know about US R&D in ASW. This situation, of course, is part of the larger problem of intelligence analysts not having access to sensitive US military R&D. If this condition persists, we may want to consider ways of conveying the squishiness of such judgments better than we have in the past.

g. Translating R&D into Operational Systems. The operational problems and degradations involved in turning an R&D prototype into a combat-ready operational system are glossed over in the estimate--although we did make progress in the treatment of ICBM accuracy this year. We should incorporate this factor in other areas, such as air defense and ASW.

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i. Strategic Passive Hardening. The treatment of this subject in paragraph 307 of Volume II was a late entry sponsored largely by Air Force. It was very general and did not get much review or independent analysis. This seems like a subject that deserves fuller treatment and quantification based on thorough study. The Air Force representative also urged that next year's estimate take an integrated approach to the question of the overall consequences and implications of strategic defense, civil defense, and hardening of facilities.

j. Backfire. Our consideration of the touchy Backfire performance issue was made more difficult this year by the fact that the SIC dropped out of the picture around mid-year and no other interagency forum picked it up. We were left with a mixed bag of differing Agency positions in various stages of completion, and our efforts to develop a coherent statement on the problem through the mechanisms of the estimate were less than satisfactory. Our strong recommendation is that the new Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee be tasked with this problem as soon as it becomes a functional body.

k. Launch-on-Warning. There was some opinion that this topic should be looked at more closely and get more treatment in next year's estimate. Others were skeptical of how much we could say but agreed that perhaps we should not dismiss it as lightly as we do now.



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PROJECTS BELIEVED WORTHY OF PRIORITY CONSIDERATION BY NIO/SP

- Intelligence Capabilities to Monitor Soviet Compliance with a SALT TWO Agreement (Requested by NSC Staff)
- Likelihood of Soviet Interference with US Space Systems in Crises and Conflicts (Requested by OMB)
- Soviet Passive Defense Programs and Their Implications (Suggested by NIE 11-3/8-75 team, among others)
- Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Attack Against Targets and Forces Outside the Continental US (Suggested by NIE 11-3/8-75 team)